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The costs of the current suboptimal carbon abatement policy are likely in
the range of 3 to 6 trillion 2005 US dollars. Using methods from the po-
litical economy of environmental policy, the paper develops a new carbon
abatement policy instrument, carbon securities. A carbon security entitles
its owner to a ﬁxed proportion of ex ante unknown total emissions. This
creates an additional group of stakeholders on the side of the issue that has
traditionally been underrepresented. The advantages over existing systems
include an equilibrium carbon price closer to the social optimum, a more
predictable environmental policy, and higher investment in abatement tech-
nology.
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1There is strong scientiﬁc evidence that to maximize the present value of world
income a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by at least 10 percent is advisable.
The currently implemented emission reductions of a few percent fall short of this
benchmark. The costs of this suboptimal policy choice are likely in the range of
3 to 6 trillion 2005 US dollars and possibly higher (Nordhaus (2010), Keller et
al. (2007)). There is strong evidence that industry interests are at least in part
responsible for the failure of governments to pass appropriate climate legislation.
A recent example is the US climate change bill that was eventually rejected in the
Senatein2010. AsawholetheUSeconomywouldmostlikelynotbesigniﬁcantly
hurt by moderate carbon abatement, but certain industries - in particular oil and
coal - would be. It is not surprising that these industries mounted a large lobbying
campaign to protect their interests.1
Carbon abetment policy all over the world is inﬂuenced by lobbyists. While
there are some environmental interest groups, there are better ﬁnanced, more in-
ﬂuential lobbies representing the interests of industries that feel that they beneﬁt
from a low level of carbon abatement. The outcome is frequently the implementa-
tion of a policy that deviates from the social welfare maximizing policy and makes
concessions to interest groups (Markussen and Svendsen (2005), Ekins and Speck
(1999)).
The existing literature on the political economy of environmental policy iden-
tiﬁes lobbies as likely contributors to suboptimal policy choices. This paper takes
the analysis one important step further by suggesting a new policy instrument, car-
bon securities, that perform better in a political environment with lobbying than
existing policy instruments. The main advantage of the policy instrument I pro-
pose is that it creates stakeholders with an interest in low carbon emissions. The
active participation of this group in the policy-making process counterbalances to
an extend the lobbying of industries that feel that they beneﬁt from a low level of
carbon abatement, in the following referred to as the carbon-using industry.
Speciﬁcally, suppose a total of n carbon securities is sold at time t=1. A carbon
security gives the owner of the security the right to emit (or to sell this right) at
time t=2 up to 1
nX, where X is the society’s total desired carbon emissions for pe-
riod 2. The amount X is unknown to any potential buyer of the security at the time
when she has to decide whether she wants to purchase a security or not. At the
beginning of period 2, the political process determines the society’s total desired
1Between January 2009 and and June 2010 ﬁrms from the U.S. oil and gas sector spent $250
million on lobbying. Spending in 2009 was up by 30% increase compared to 2008. Lobbying
expenditures of the coal industry increased in 2008 and have since been at signiﬁcantly higher
levels than in 2007 and before. (Source: Center for Responsive Politics).
2carbon emissions, X. When choosing X the political process takes into account
the voters’ preferences and any contributions from lobbies representing either the
interests of the carbon-using industry or the owners of carbon securities.2
While both emission permits and carbon securities establish property rights,
there are some important differences. Permits give the owner the right to emit
a ﬁxed amount of carbon which is set prior to the sale of the permit. Carbon
securities entitle the owner to a ﬁxed proportion of total emissions, which have not
yet been set at the time when the securities are sold. The government can at any
time print additional permits after the initial sale, while it cannot print additional
securities until the current securities have matured. Alternatively, it is possible to
think of a carbon security as a bond that pays a coupon in the form of a carbon
allowance of 1
nX.
The paper considers a two-period model of an economy using carbon securi-
ties. The key results of the two-period model extend in a straight forward man-
ner to a multi-period framework in which a security is valid until period T and
gives the owner the right to emit a ﬁxed proportion of total desired emissions
each period between 2 and T.3 Therefore the paper focusses on the more tractable
two-period model.
The paper in a sense bridges the gap between the literature on the political
economy of environmental policy (see for example Stavins (2004), Oates and
Portney (2003), Aidt (1998)) and the literature on environmental policy instru-
ment design (see for example Baumol and Oates (1988), Keohane et al. (2002),
Metcalf (2009), Murray et al. (2009), Webster et al. (2010)).
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), this paper assumes that the govern-
ment’s decision making is not only inﬂuenced by social welfare considerations
but also by lobbies who make campaign contributions if they think that attempt-
ing to inﬂuence the carbon price is in their best interest. For example, under a
carbon tax system the carbon-using industry has an incentive to lobby for a low
tax rate. Under a carbon securities system, the lobby of the carbon-using industry
is in favor of a large emission total, X, while the owners of the securities have an
incentive to organize and lobby in favor of an emission quantity that maximizes
2The term ’carbon-using industry’ is used to refer to all industries which would be subject to
a carbon tax or a carbon permit system. For example, the Waxman-Markey proposal applies to
about 85 percent of ﬁrms.
3A related yet signiﬁcantly different policy tool are long term permits as proposed by McKib-
bin and Wilcoxen (2002). However, their long-term permit entitles the owner to emit a speciﬁed
amount of carbon every year for the life of the permit. To the best of my knowledge no permit sys-
tem with long term permits with ex ante uncertain yearly emission allowance has been suggested.
3the value of the securities.
The paper shows that carbon securities have a number of advantages over ex-
isting policy tools. First, the lobbying process leads to a carbon price level that
is closer to the social optimum than with a tax or permit system. This is a di-
rect consequence of the presence of stakeholders with an interest in low carbon
emissions. Second, climate and political uncertainty have a smaller effect on the
expected variance in the carbon price. While there is ex ante uncertainty about the
amount of carbon emissions allowed per security, the variance of the carbon price
is smaller. Third, there is higher investment in carbon abatement technology with
carbon securities. There is a stronger incentives to develop and adopt abatement
technology since carbon securities encourage both a higher and a more stable car-
bon price. Fourth, a system based on carbon securities also has implications for
commitment to environmental policy. The introduction of carbon securities alters
the policy environment so that the government can, in effect, credibly commit to
long term policies even when the government can only commit to property rights
but not to tax rates or policy levels. When a government introduces a carbon tax,
the next government can fairly easily discontinue the carbon tax. The property
rights established when carbon securities are introduced are signiﬁcantly more
stable.
1 The Model
Both policy instruments considered here - carbon tax and carbon securities - are
studied within two period games, referred to as tax game and the carbon securities
game. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the government announces the policy
instrument of its choice. If carbon securities are the chosen policy instrument, the
government sells the securities. The potential buyers are the m carbon-using ﬁrms
and investors that do not belong to the carbon-using industry. Each carbon-using
ﬁrm i chooses its level of investment in abatement technology Ii. The carbon-
using industry and the owners of carbon securities each organize themselves as
a lobby. In the second period, information about the state of the world is re-
vealed. The lobby or lobbies then offer their contribution schedule(s) which are
conditional on the carbon price selected. The government chooses the level of the
carbon price that maximizes its welfare. Then each owner of a carbon security
sells her carbon allowance, 1
nX, to ﬁrms required to hold a carbon allowances
equal to their carbon emission in period 2. The following describes the stages of
the game in more detail starting with the last stage.
4Consider period 2 of the carbon securities game. Let periods be short so that
demand for energy, D, can reasonably be approximated as deterministic. Then
setting an emission level X and setting a carbon price are equivalent. For each
level of aggregate investment in energy-saving technology, X determines the car-
bon price via
D(p;I) = X (1)
where D is a decreasing function of both the carbon price p and aggregate invest-
mentinenergysavingtechnologyI. Alternatively, inthetaxgamethegovernment
sets the price of carbon p directly. For ease of comparison between the tax game
and the carbon securities game and also to stay within the established convention
of the literature based on Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government’s choice
variable is the carbon price in both games.
Social welfare depends on the amount of carbon emissions. On the one hand,
high emissions lead to more global warming and hence higher global warming
related costs GW. These cost are a decreasing function of p, @GW=@p < 0, and
also a decreasing function of I, @GW=@I < 0. On the other hand, a high carbon
price has adverse effects on social welfare since it has negative effects on the
carbon-using industry and leads to higher consumer prices. Social welfare is here
to be thought of as discounted GDP. This consumption cost, GC, increases with p,
@GC=@p > 0, but decreases with I, @GC=@I < 0. The social cost of the carbon
price is deﬁned as
G(p;I) = GW(p;I) + GC(p;I) (2)
G()isthedifferencebetweentheexpectedcostofglobalwarmingwhichdecrease
with emissions, X, and the beneﬁts of a low energy price. In practice, there is
considerable uncertainty about G. So G is to be interpreted as a best estimate.
The government welfare is the weighted sum of campaign contributions and
voters’ welfare:
WG(p;;I) = CB(p;;I) + CE(p;;I)   G(p;I) (3)
CB and CE are the campaign contributions of the carbon securities holders and
the carbon-using industry, respectively. The government chooses p to maximize
WG. The variable, , can be understood as the government’s preference variable.
In the Grossman Helpman model it is interpreted as the weight of voter welfare
relative to campaign contributions. A politician with a high value of  values
the interests of the electorate more highly than a politician with a low value of
. The parameter  is interpreted as climate or political uncertainty as Section
5II.B elaborate. Note that in period 1, when the investment decision is made,  is
unknown. At the beginning of the second period,  is realized.
Next, consider the lobbying stage of the game. It is assumed that the ﬁrms of the
carbon-using industry are able to organize themselves into a lobby group in order
to inﬂuence the political process and that the lobby of the carbon-using industry
does not face any borrowing constraints when it makes campaign contributions.
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total proﬁt of the industry and I =
m P
i=1
Ii is total investment in abatement technol-
ogy. The lobby of the industry chooses the contribution CE to maximize net of
contributions industry welfare: maxCE (p)   I   CE(p). The gross of contribu-
tions welfare of the owners of carbon securities is the value of the securities in the






where  is the price that the government sold an security for and n is the total
number of securities. 4 The revenue of the owners of the securities,  p@
@p =
 p0(p), is the product of the carbon price and the emission quota. A carbon
security holder prefers a carbon price that maximizes  p0(p).
As for the lobby of the carbon-using industry, it is assumed that the owners of
the carbon securities are able to organize themselves into a lobby group in order
to inﬂuence the political process. The lobby of the owners of carbon securities
does not face any borrowing constraints when they make campaign contributions.
Finally, consider the investment stage. Suppose that each ﬁrm i believes itself
too small to have any meaningful impact on the carbon price p or the aggregate
investment level I. No industry-wide coordination is possible on investment. The
motivation for this assumption is that it is fairly easy for the other ﬁrms to observe
if a ﬁrm contributes to the lobby, but it is much harder to observe how much a ﬁrm
4The sale of the carbon securities is not explicitly modeled here. Conducting an auction has
some well known advantages. However, all results of the paper also follow thorough if the carbon
securities would be sold at a ﬁxed price (which could be zero).
6invests in abatement technology. So free-riding is a more pressing concern when
it comes to investment than for lobby contributions.
In period 1, each ﬁrm individually chooses an investment level Ii which de-
termines its demand for energy in the following period. For given p , I and  an
individual ﬁrm’s proﬁt depends on its investment decision:




The carbon price p is an input price. Thus, @
@p < 0. An individual ﬁrm’s demand
for energy is  @
@p =  0.
If a ﬁrm invests, it requires less energy for its production. So for any p ,
@( 0)
@I < 0. In other words, for a given carbon price, a ﬁrm’s demand for energy
decreases with the investment level.
An important question is who would buy the carbon securities when the gov-
ernment sells them in the ﬁrst period. The effectiveness of carbon securities as a
policy tool depends on the allocation of the carbon securities in the second period.
There is an incentive to form a lobby in favor of maximizing the value of the se-
curities unless the carbon securities are all held by carbon using ﬁrms and each
ﬁrm’s proportion of carbon securities is the same as the ﬁrm’s share of future car-
bon emissions. The beneﬁts of carbon securities increase with the fraction of the
securities is held for investment purposes (resale) and not for a ﬁrm’s own carbon
consumption. This paper ﬁrst focuses for ease of exposition on the benchmark
case in which all securities are held by outsiders to the carbon-using industries
and then discusses what happens if this is not the case.
Environmental interest groups like Greenpeace, the Sierra Club and Earth-
watch are not included in the model. There are two reason for this: First, the size
of the budget of environmental interest groups is signiﬁcantly smaller than the
contributions made by major carbon-using industries. Second, it seems likely that
the attention of environmental interest groups would shift from global warming to
other environmental issues once a system with carbon securities led to a carbon
price close to the social optimum.
2 A Carbon Tax
2.1 The Equilibrium
Suppose a carbon tax is the policy instrument. The two period game can be solved
by backward induction. First, the menu auction stage in which p is determined has
7to be considered. In a second step, the individual ﬁrm’s investment decision can
be analyzed. The investment decision depends on the expected carbon price and
potentially on the variance of the carbon price.
The lobby offers a contribution function, which speciﬁes a ﬁnancial contribu-
tion depending on the government’s choice of the carbon price. Thus, the game is
a menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston (1986)).
Deﬁnition1. AnequilibriumofthetaxgameisacontributionfunctionCE(p;;I),
a set of individual ﬁrm investment levels (I1;:::Im) and a carbon price p such that
a) for each ﬁrm i, Ii 2 = maximizes the expected net of contributions welfare
of the ﬁrm given the expected equilibrium contribution schedules and carbon
price
b) CE(p;;I) and p are an equilibrium of the menu auction stage of the carbon
securities game; that is
(i) the contribution function maximizes the joint welfare of the lobby’s mem-
bers given the carbon price p
(ii) carbon price p maximizes the government’s objective taking the contri-
bution function as given
The following proposition states the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for an
equilibrium of the menu auction stage of the tax game.
Proposition 1. Given the aggregate investment level I, (C0
E;pT) is an equilibrium
of the menu auction stage if and only if
a) C0
E is feasible
b) pT maximizes CE(p;;I)   G(p;I)
c) pT maximizes WE(p;;I)   G(p;I)
d) there exists a pE that maximizes WG(p;;I) such that C0
E(pE) = 0
The ﬁrst condition of the proposition is a standard feasibility condition. The
secondconditionrequiresthatthecarbonpriceisoptimalforthegovernmentsince
CE(p;;I) aG(p;I) is the government revenue after contributions have been re-
ceived. The third and fourth conditions together state that the lobby’s contribution
schedule has be optimal.
8In general, there are a large number of equilibria in menu auctions. However,
only equilibria supported by so-called truthful contribution schedules are stable
to non-binding communication among players. Also, the best response set to
any strategy played by an opponent includes a truthful strategy (Bernheim and
Whinston (1986)). Therefore, I focus in the following on equilibria supported by
truthful contribution schedules.
Deﬁnition 2. A truthful contribution schedule takes the form Ci(p;;I;Bi) =
max[0;Wi   Bi] where Bi is a constant.
Corollary 1. Suppose the contribution schedule is truthful. There is a unique
equilibrium. The equilibrium carbon price pT satisﬁes G0(p;I) = 0(p;I).
Proposition 2. The carbon price under a tax system is lower than the socially
optimal price: pT < p.
Most current research suggests that the optimal carbon price is between $30
(Nordhaus (2010)) and $85 (Stern (2007)) per ton. The current actual carbon price
is approximately $5.
In the absence of lobbying the government would choose the level of carbon
abatement that maximizes social welfare. However, with lobbying in favor of no
or minimal carbon abatement, the carbon price set by the government is below the
socially optimal price. Since investment is positively correlated with the expected
carbon price, the equilibrium investment level, IT, is below the investment level
at the optimal carbon price, I.
2.2 Effect of Uncertainty
In period 1, there may be signiﬁcant uncertainty about the state of the world in
period 2. This can take the form of either climate uncertainty (how costly global
warming is) or political uncertainty (what party will be in charge). This section
shows how both types of uncertainty can be considered within the framework of
the model. The goal is to study uncertainty while keeping the model as simple as
possible. The following shows that the variance of  can be interpreted as either
political uncertainty or climate uncertainty.
First consider political uncertainty: a situation in which in period 1 it is un-
known which party will be in charge of choosing the carbon price once time 2 is
reached. Suppose there are at least two parties and these parties differ in how im-















Figure 1: The effect of uncertainty
weights on campaign contributions relative to voter welfare. The ex ante (period
1) variance of period 2’s carbon price depends on the distribution of .
Next, assume that there is no political uncertainty (all politicians have an 
equal to H) but there is considerable uncertainty about the climate. The social
cost of carbon function can either be G or F and this uncertainty is not resolved
until period 2 is reached. The state of the world characterized by social cost
of carbon function G can be thought of as a state with high climate sensitivity
and global warming imposing signiﬁcant cost to society. The state of the world
characterized by social cost of carbon function F can be interpreted as a state
with either low climate sensitivity, efﬁcient geoengineering options or low cost
of global warming. If the social cost of carbon function is G then the socially
optimal carbon price is p
G and any downward deviations are expensive. Hence G0
is steep (see Figure 1). If the social cost of carbon function is F then the socially
optimal carbon price is p
F and any downward deviations are less expensive than
under G.
10As Figure 1 shows, the same equilibrium as under F can be found by using
G and choosing the appropriate , here L. Therefore, to keep things as simple
as possible both climate uncertainty and political uncertainty is in the following
studied by varying .
2.3 A Comparison to a Permit System
Most of the literature considers carbon tax systems and cap and trade systems as
policy instruments with signiﬁcant differences and correspondingly different ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Within the model considered here both instruments
have more similarities than differences. Hence it is useful to consider them to-
gether. The two policy instruments are essentially equivalent here since (i) there
is no demand uncertainty within a period, (ii) both under the tax and the cap and
tradesystem, thepolicyissetatthebeginningofperiod2and(iii)thereisnobank-
ing of permits since there is only one period in which permits are required. So it
does not make a difference whether the carbon price is chosen by the government
or whether an emission quantity is chosen. Both lead to the same equilibrium. 5
3 Carbon Securities
Compared to other carbon abatement policy instruments, the key feature of system
with carbon securities is that the amount of carbon emissions allowed per security
isdeterminedafterthesecurityhasbeensold. Eachofthencarbonsecuritiesgives
its owner the right to emit up to 1
n of the society’s total desired carbon emissions
for year 2, X. This amount X is unknown to potential buyers at time 1 when they
have to decide whether they want to purchase a security or not. Once all securities
have been sold, ﬁrms choose their level of investment in energy-saving technology
technology. In period 2 the political process determines X, taking into account
the voters’ preferences, the aggregate investment level and any contributions from
lobbies representing either the interests of the carbon-using industry or the owners
of carbon securities.
5The assumption that there is no demand uncertainty within a period, is more realistic for short
periods than for long periods. The model could be extended to the case of demand uncertainty.
However, demand uncertainty affects both a cap and trade system and the here proposed system
equally, so for the purpose of comparing an existing mechanism to a new mechanism, very little is
gained by including demand uncertainty.
11Thesecuritiesgameisacommonagencygamewithtwoprincipals, thelobbies
of the carbon-using industry and the holders of carbon securities, and one agent,
the government, who has the discretionary power of selecting the carbon price.
Lobbyists compete by simultaneously offering contribution schedules conditional
on the policy ultimately selected. The government chooses the carbon price which
maximizes its welfare, which depends on the weighted sum of campaign contri-
butions and social welfare.
As in the previous section on the tax game, there are essentially two periods.
In the ﬁrst period the following actions and events take place: The government
sells n securities. The owners of the securities form a lobby and the carbon-
using industry forms a lobby. Each ﬁrm in the carbon-using industry chooses
its investment level. In the second period, the lobbies ﬁnd out how much the
government is inﬂuenced by campaign contributions. The lobbies then offer their
contribution schedules. The government chooses an amount of desired maximum
carbon emissions X and thereby determines the price of carbon p. Each security
owner sells X
n carbon allowances to ﬁrms in the carbon-using industry at a price
of p per unit of carbon.
The government has similar preferences as in the previous section. The only
addition is that the government now receives campaign contributions not just from
the lobby of the carbon-using industry but from the lobby representing the inter-
ests of the carbon securities holders.
3.1 The Equilibrium of the Carbon Securities Game
The fundamental difference between the carbon securities game and the tax game
is that in the former there is political competition while in the later there is not.
In the carbon securities game there are two active lobbies, while in the tax game
only the lobby of the carbon-using industry is active. Political competition has a
strong effect on the equilibrium carbon price and campaign contributions.
Deﬁnition 3. An equilibrium of the carbon securities game is a set of contribution
functions fCE(p;;I);CB(p;;I)g, an investment level I and a carbon price p
such that
a) I maximizes the expected net of contributions welfare of the carbon-using in-
dustry given the expected equilibrium contribution schedules and carbon price
b) fCE(p;;I);CB(p;;I)g and p are an equilibrium of the menu auction stage
of the carbon securities game; that is
12(i) each contribution function maximizes the joint welfare of the group’s
members given the carbon price and the other groups contribution func-
tion
(ii) carbon price p maximizes the government’s objective taking the contri-
bution function as given
Proposition 3. Given the investment level I, (C
B;C
E;pS) is an equilibrium of the




b) pS maximizes CB(p;;I) + CE(p;;I)   G(p;I)
c) pS maximizes WB(p;;I)   G(p;I) + CE(p;;I)
d) there exists a pB that maximizes WG(p;;I) such that C
B(pB) = 0
e) pS maximizes WE(p;;I)   G(p;I) + CB(p;;I)
f) there exists a pE that maximizes WG(p;;I) such that C
E(pE) = 0
This proposition extends Proposition 1 by adding an optimality condition for
the lobby of the owners of carbon securities.
Corollary 2. Suppose contribution schedules are truthful. There is a unique equi-
librium. The equilibrium carbon price pS satisﬁes G0(p;I) =  p00(p;I).
3.2 Comparison with a tax or permit system
With a permit system or a carbon tax, only the carbon-using industry has a strong
ﬁnancial incentive to lobby for a carbon price in its favor. Introducing property
rights for emissions creates a counterbalancing force: now there is a group that
has a strong ﬁnancial interest in lobbying for a high carbon price. Hence, the
equilibrium carbon price is higher. However, under both system the carbon price
is below the social optimum.
If ﬁrms’ investment in the ﬁrst period is unaffected by this switch of policy
instruments, then the new equilibrium with carbon securities is at the intersection
of the dashed line and the G0

















Figure 2: The equilibrium with carbon securities.
for carbon is inelastic which will be assumed in the following.6 With carbon
securities, increasing the carbon price is more attractive for the government since
it leads to a higher campaign contributions from the lobby of the carbon security
holders.
As forward looking actors, ﬁrms anticipate in period 1 that there switch from a
carbon tax to carbon securities implies that carbon emissions in the second period
will be more expensive. Therefore, they will invest more in carbon abatement
technology in the ﬁrst period. This increase in ﬁrst period investment affects both
the G0 line and the  p00 line. The G0 shifts to the right and the  p00 line shifts
upwards in response to an increase in aggregate investment I. The equilibrium
carbon price with carbon securities is pS.
If there is no effect on investment, the carbon price increases to ’pS under
constant investment.’ However, since there is now a higher equilibrium carbon
price and investment is more attractive under a higher carbon price, there is higher
equilibrium investment. Assume in the following that a high economy-wide level
of investment in abatement technology makes it attractive to set tight emission
6Numerous empirical studies show that demand for carbon based energy sources is typically
inelastic. See for example Cooper (2003).
14target and that deviations from the optimal carbon price are no more desirable
than at lower investment levels.7 The new socially optimal carbon price is pS
.
The equilibrium carbon price under the increased investment level is pS.
Proposition 4. While the carbon price under either system is below the social
optimum, pT < p(IT) and pS  p(IS), in the carbon securities game the carbon
price is higher than in the tax game: pT < pS.
Thus, the carbon price is higher in the carbon securities game for two reasons.
First, there is the lobbying effect. Having political competition over the carbon
price mitigates the effect of the lobby of the carbon-using industry. Second, there
is an investment effect. A change in the equilibrium price affects investment in
energy saving technology. This change in the investment level has an effect on
the socially optimal carbon price and therefore also on the equilibrium carbon
price. The size of the effect depends on how sensitive investment is to carbon
price changes, how much the socially optimal carbon price depends on investment
and on the industry proﬁt function (how easy it is to substitute away from energy
sources that require carbon allowances). How close the equilibrium carbon price
with carbon securities is to p depends on the industry proﬁt function as the follow
example shows.
Example 1. Consider the case of a linear proﬁt function. This is the situation in
which investment is essentially equivalent to gaining access to a speciﬁc blueprint
for production technology and this technology requires a constant amount of car-
bon based energy per unit of output. If  is linear then 00 and 000 are equal to
zero. Therefore, pS = pand
dpS




So as expected, the tax equilibrium price increases with : With a high , the
government puts more weight on social welfare and the tax equilibrium price is
higher.
A signiﬁcant advantage of carbon securities is that they make environmental
policy more predictable. To see this consider a two party system, one with a high
7The motivation for the assumption is the observation that in countries with low levels of
investment in abatement technology, the price of carbon emission is lower than in countries with
high levels of investment in abatement technology. The second part of the assumption states that
curves G0
T and G0
P in Figure 2 do not cross.
15 and one with a low  and suppose that there are elections between period 1 and
2. If the party with the high  is elected, then irrespective of the policy instrument,
the abatement level will be close to p. If the party with the high  is elected, then
with a carbon tax a carbon price signiﬁcantly below p may be chosen but with
carbon securities the carbon price will be fairly close to p. So with a carbon
tax, there is signiﬁcant uncertainty what the carbon price will be. With carbon
securities both parties choose a similar carbon price, albeit for different reasons.
The question how early (period 1) investment in energy-saving technology is
affected by the choice of the policy instrument is consequently best approached
from the perspective of the investment under uncertainty literature (Dixit and
Pindyck (1994)). Switching from a tax system to carbon securities affects both
the level of the carbon price and the variance of the carbon price. The increase in
the expected carbon price makes investment in alternative energy more attractive.
The reduction in the variance of the carbon price also encourages investment if the
investment is (partially) irreversible. Intuitively, investment in abatement technol-
ogy is attractive if the carbon price is high but not if it is low. By waiting until
uncertainty is resolved a ﬁrm avoids making the costly mistake of having invested
but the state of the world turning out to be a low socially optimal carbon price
(global warming not a serious problem). A decrease of the uncertainty over the
future returns from investment, reduces the value of waiting and therefore makes
investment in period 1 more attractive. So IT < IS.
Also, in the carbon securities game the expected level of global warming is
lower than in the tax game due to two effects: First, the carbon price in the carbon
securities game is higher because it is closer to the socially optimal carbon price.
Second, the socially optimal carbon price in the carbon securities game is higher
because there is more investment in energy saving technology. Both effects leads
to less global warming in the case of the securities game.
Next, consider government revenue under both the system with carbon secu-
rities and under a tax or permit system. Both a permit system and a carbon se-
curities system can be designed so that there is government revenue from selling
or auctioning permits or securities. If permits or securities are auctioned off, the
revenue is equal in size to that of a tax that generates the same amount of emis-
sions. If demand for carbon is inelastic, Proposition 4 implies that government
revenue is larger under the here proposed policy instrument than under traditional
alternatives.
Finally, consider the effect of the policy instrument choice on total campaign
contributions. Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that if a lobby faces no op-
position from competing interests it is able to extract all surplus from its political
16relationship with the government. This implies that contributions of the carbon-
using industry in the tax game are equal to the difference of the social cost of
carbon function under the tax game equilibrium price and the social cost of car-
bon function under the socially optimal price. If there are two active lobbies as
in the carbon securities game, the government captures all of the surplus from the
political relationships.
3.3 ThePerformanceofCarbonSecuritiesWhenSomeCarbon-
Using Firms Purchase Carbon Securities
Carbon securities are ﬁnancial assets with an uncertain future value. The future
value of carbon securities is affected by climate uncertainty, political uncertainty
and uncertainty about the demand for fossil fuels. It seems therefore plausible
to anticipate that a large share of securities is bought by investment banks and
other entities specialized on investment in assets with uncertain returns. Also,
acquiring information about the CO2 market and hiring experts to make forecasts
of CO2 prices is costly. Therefore, there are likely signiﬁcant economies of scale
which favor investment banks.8
The may be some concerns that carbon securities could be purchased to pre-
vent the formation of a counterlobby by for instance the lobby of carbon using
ﬁrms. If this lobby buys all securities it can prevent the formation of a lobby of
carbon securities holders. As outlined above there are reasons why an average
carbon using ﬁrm is unlikely to be interested in purchasing carbon securities. So
any plan involving a purchase of all carbon securities by the carbon using ﬁrms
has to overcome a signiﬁcant free-rider problem. A ﬁrm in the carbon using in-
dustries prefers that other ﬁrms in the industry purchase all securities but would
rather not purchase any securities itself. It seems very unlikely that the lobby of
carbon using ﬁrms would be able to monitor if their members choose to purchase
an appropriate amount of carbon securities. This is much more difﬁcult to monitor
than if ﬁrms pay their lobby contributions.
In addition, politicians have a strong incentive to set in place laws prohibiting
insider ownership since they beneﬁts from the presence of an additional interest
group. With an addition interest group representing people who bought carbon
securities for investment purposes, politicians receive higher campaign contribu-
tions and the equilibrium policy level is closer to the social optimum and should
8While there may be some large ﬁrms affected by abatement policy with sufﬁcient economies
of scale to hire experts, a large number of ﬁrm affected are small and medium size ﬁrms.
17hence appeal more to the electorate.
If an outsider to the carbon using industry owns a carbon security, this investor
prefers a carbon price that maximizes the value of the carbon securities,  p0(p).
This changes if a carbon security is held by an insider to the carbon-using industry.
An insider owns carbon securities for his own consumption of carbon allowances
and possibly in addition to that in order to sell any left over carbon allowances to
other ﬁrms. The insider prefers an emission quota high enough so that her own
carbon emissions are covered by her carbon allowances. However, there is hardly
any proﬁt realized from selling any left over allowances if the price is very low.
Hence, a carbon price of zero is not proﬁt maximizing for a carbon using ﬁrm that
owns carbon allowances.9
Suppose that of the m identical ﬁrms in the industry a fraction  holds the
n securities and that each of these m ﬁrms holds the same share of the carbon
securities. The remaining ﬁrms have to purchase emissions coupons after the
menu auction stage from these m ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms belonging to the fraction  are both users of carbon allowances and
sellers. As they require allowances themselves, they beneﬁt from a low carbon
price, however, since they sell their leftover coupons, a high carbon price can be
of advantage to them.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium price with some securities held by insiders lies
between the carbon securities equilibrium price with 100% outsider ownership
and the tax equilibrium price: pT < pS < pS:
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium if some of the carbon securities are held
by carbon-using ﬁrms. The line 0(p)   (1   )p00(p) shows the marginal
campaign contributions as a function of the carbon price.
A system based on carbon securities performs better with respect to equilib-
rium carbon price, variance of the carbon price and investment level than a system
based on either a carbon tax or carbon permits if at least one of the carbon using
ﬁrm does not purchases a share of carbon securities that is equal to its share of
carbon emission. A carbon securities system performs as well as a tax or permit
system if every carbon using ﬁrm purchases a share of carbon securities that is
equal to its share of future carbon emission.
In practice this means that unless the unlikely event that all securities are
bought by carbon-using ﬁrms and each ﬁrm purchases a fraction of carbon se-
curities that exactly equals its share of future total emissions, carbon securities














αΠ0(p) − (1 − α)pΠ00(p)
Figure 3: The range of equilibrium carbon prices if some carbon-using ﬁrms pur-
chase carbon securities.
perform better - both with respect to the level of the equilibrium price and with
respect to the variance of the equilibrium price - than a carbon tax system or a
carbon permit system.
This superperfect distribution in which all securities are bought by carbon-
using ﬁrms and each ﬁrm purchases a fraction of carbon securities that exactly
equals its share of future total emissions is not just highly unlikely to occur in
practice but is also undesirable from the perspective of a politician. The reason
is that campaign contributions are lower for security distributions close to the
superperfect distribution.
So far this chapter only considered the case that all securities are held by
carbon-using ﬁrms and the fraction  speciﬁed how many of the ﬁrms own se-
curities and how many do not. It is of course also conceivable that some securities
are held by carbon using ﬁrms and some securities are held by outsiders to the
carbon-using industry. However, this case is analytically equivalent to the case
discussed above. It makes no difference if a carbon using ﬁrm purchases a secu-
rity for investment purposes or if an outside investor purchases the carbon security
for investment purposes. All that matters is what fraction of securities is held for
investment purposes or in other words held with the intend to sell allowances.
194 Conclusion
In a perfect world there would be no lobbies motivated by self interest since the
policy makers is not inﬂuenced by campaign contributions but only by social wel-
fare considerations. This paper showed that in a less than perfect world carbon
securities have signiﬁcant advantages over existing policy instruments.
One issue that has not yet been to addressed is the potentially large opposition
against the initial introduction of carbon securities. This is a legitimate concern
and it may take a one time political will to introduce the system, thing that carbon
securities have going for them is that they are a very attractive policy instrument
from a politician’s point of view.
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21A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition follows immediately from Lemma 2 of
Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
Proof of Corollary 1. First, consider uniqueness. When the contribution schedule
is truthful, condition (b) of Proposition 1 simpliﬁes to
WE(p;I)   BE   G(p;I)
where BE is a constant. Therefore, conditions (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 lead to
the same ﬁrst order condition. Second, to see that the equilibrium carbon price pT
satisﬁes G0(p;I) = 0(p;I) start with either condition (b) and (c) of Proposition
1 and replace WE with the expression in Equation 4. This yields
(p;I)   I   BE   G(p;I)
Therefore, the FOC characterizing the equilibrium of the tax game is G0(p;I) =
0(p;I).
Proof of Proposition 2. Since p is an input price  is a decreasing function of p:
0 < 0. This implies that the tax game equilibrium price, pT, has to be in the
range of p in which it holds that G0(p;I) < 0. Since G by assumption has a
unique minimum, p, it follows that G0(p;I) < 0 for all p < p. Therefore,
pT < p.
Proof of Proposition 3. SimilarlytoProposition1, theresultfollowsfromLemma
2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
Proof of Corollary 2. Uniqueness under truthful strategies follows directly from
Propositions 3 and the deﬁnition of truthful strategy:
CB(p;;I) = WB(p)   BB
and
CE(p;;I) = WE(p)   BE
Therefore, conditions (b), (c) and (e) lead to the same ﬁrst order condition when
strategies are truthful. Substituting the relevant terms, p maximizes
 p
0(p)   n   G(p) + (p)   I   BE
where I, BE,  and n do not depend (in the menu auction stage) on the choice
of p. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition that characterizes the equilibrium of the
carbon securities is G0(p;I) =  p00(p;I).
22Proof of Proposition 4. Similar to Proposition 2. It follows from the properties of
the G function and of demand being inelastic that pT < pS.
Proof of Proposition 5. As before, consider a common agency game. The two
groups of ﬁrms have different interest, therefore it makes sense for them to form
separate lobbies. Each lobby attempts to affect the carbon price in their favor.
Their gross of contributions payoff of the (1   )m ﬁrms that did not purchase
any carbon securities is
WE(1 )(p;I;I1 ) = (1   )(p;I;I1 )   I1 
and the gross of contributions payoff of the m ﬁrms that did purchase carbon
securities is
WE(p;I;I1 ) = (p;I;I1 )   I   (1   )p
0(p;I;I1 )   n
where I and I1  are the respective aggregate investment levels.
The government maximizes the weighted sum of campaign contributions and
voters’ welfare. WG denotes the welfare of the government:
WG(p;;I;I1 ) = CE(1 )(p;I;I1 ) + CE(p;I;I1 )   G(p;I;I1 )
The ﬁrst order condition describing the equilibrium if a fraction  of the ﬁrms
in the carbon-using industry holds the n securities is

0(p)   (1   )p
00(p)   G
0(p) = 0:
Recall from Corollaries 1 and 2 that the equilibrium condition characterizing








Thereforetheequilibriumpriceinthe caseconsideredhere, pS, satisﬁes pT <
pS < pS.
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